I have completed my read of "Thirteen Roman Defeats: The Disasters That Made The Legions," by Ian Hughes (published by Pen and Sword Military); the ARC I was provided was a delightful reminder of the way that some texts can illuminate the challenges of literary and historical scholarship almost as a sort of graceful diversion from the text's central point. The topic here is rather straightforward in that the book methodically examines thirteen Roman battles that did not go well for the legions. The battles examined stretch from the Republican period to near the end of the Empire. It is a truism that a military establishment can learn from its triumphs, and this is fairly obvious, but it is sometimes overlooked that military debacles can as easily lead to everything from technical and structural reexaminations of the way things are done to sweeping reforms predicated on perceived errors in strategic and tactical thought. For me, however, the charm of this book rests on the way the author skillfully interrogates his sources (which are frequently both obscure and conflicting--often spectacularly). I found that examining the way the author explains his sources and weighs them in terms of describing precisely what may have happened is something of an education in itself quite apart from the battles under examination. Scholars or students of the Legions and the Roman way of war will find this well thought out examination a valued addition to their shelf which showcases a way of mediating sources and conclusions by shifting from a straight narrative examination to a somewhat more specialized, almost decontextualized, examination that lifts individual struggles from the narrative they are necessarily embedded in (Roman History) and takes each of them on its own merits, thereby achieving a kind of focus useful to the student of military evolution. While this style can be a bit tedious, it is, nonetheless, effective and it can lead to useful and sometimes unexpected insights.