The Hitler Diaries were a peculiar farrago of fact and fabrication. One of the more inspired lies that the forgery contained was the claim that Hitler’s decision to halt his Panzers and allow the bulk of the British Expeditionary Force to evacuate at Dunkirk was because he did not want to inflict too devastating a blow because he still hoped that the British government might come to its senses and make its peace with Nazi Germany.
The reason why this seemed so plausible was because Hitler’s admiration for Britain was on the record and seemingly genuine. In ‘Mein Kampf’ Hitler not only expressed the high regard in which he held the British ‘Tommy’ and British wartime propaganda, he also expressed the view that the Kaiser had made a grievous error in going to war with Britain at all. According to Hitler there was no need for Britain and Germany to quarrel, as Britain was essentially a maritime power and as long as she gave Britain a free hand on the continent Germany would give her blessing to Britannia continuing to rule the waves and reaping the rewards of its vast colonial possessions.
In ‘Mein Kampf’ Hitler also expressed his desire for Germany to form alliances with Britain, Italy and Japan, which would have the effect of isolating and neutralising France and make it easier for him to implement his primary objective of securing Lebensraum or living room in the east at the expense of the Soviet Union, which he detested on racial and ideological grounds.
Hitler’s subsequent expansion of the German navy is bound to cast doubt on Hitler’s ultimate intentions but this has to be set aside evidence such as his taking fighter ace Adolf Galland to task for glorying in shooting down RAF planes during the Battle of Britain, telling him that this unnecessary bloodshed should give no cause for satisfaction as it represented a distraction from the real fight which was to be against Stalin’s Russia.
This is the context in which one should approach Robert Forczyk’s ‘We March Against England’ which examines Operation Sealion (the proposed German invasion of Britain), initiated by Fuhrer Directive No.16 of 16 July 1940, and why it was postponed on 17 September 1940. To what extent was the Fuhrer’s heart never really in the affair (because he yearned to launch what became Operation Barbarossa) and to what extent did he decide to cut his losses because of fierce British resistance, most notably in the Battle of Britain?
Forczyk is keen to dispel what he sees as the myth that by “standing firm … ‘the Few’ of RAF Fighter Command frustrated Hitler’s plans to invade England and thereby inflicted the first major defeat upon the Third Reich.” He is certainly right to claim that Operation Sealion was a very much more serious threat than some historians suppose and to draw attention to the fact that Britain’s “military position remained extremely perilous” long after September 1940; acknowledging the importance of the Battle of the Atlantic, Churchill himself said that “the only thing that ever really frightened me during the war was the U-boat peril”. However, whilst it is difficult to disagree with much of Forczyk’s analysis, particularly on operational matters, his account is still open to question.
Firstly, in stating that it was not “preordained” that Hitler would “eschew Seelöwe in favour of Barbarossa” Forczyk seems unwilling to concede that for the long-held ideological reasons referred to above, Hitler would always be predisposed to abandon Sealion for Barbarossa. Secondly, in staking out a claim for the originality of his argument Forczyk appears to have ignored those who have already de-mythologized the Battle of Britain, most notably R.J. Overy, whose name features nowhere in the book.
This, then, is a very enjoyable thought-provoking exercise in military history which is often genuinely illuminating (for example reminding us of the Luftwaffe’s early capacity for precision night time bombing) even though one suspects that Forczyk's full-blooded frontal assaults are sometimes mounted against an Aunt Sally.