An interesting examination of American empire. It's not "manifest destiny", it's something far more mundane: ambition, greed, slavery... Griffin doesn't gloss over the awful to paint a picture of benevolence.

It's becoming more common for historians and political writers to take a far more critical view of America's history on the world stage, and this fits nicely among the more critical volumes.

Worth a read, if for no other reason than it will spark debate and analysis.

Griffin's title aptly describes the questions he addresses in this formidable work of American history. Many subscribe to the "exceptionalist" view of America as the divinely ordained agent of everything good in the world, and Griffin systematically deconstructs and demolishes this myth.

There is no substitute for reading the book itself, but an example of Griffin's myth-busting may suffice here. The United States under the Harding administration believed that "Bolshevism is a menace that must be destroyed," and when the fascist Benito Mussolini violently overthrew Italy's democratic government in 1922, most immediately to quash labor unrest, Harding's response was positive and "American political and business leaders, savoring the benefits of this regime, ignored its destruction of Italy's constitutional democracy." Mussolini was considered "moderate" and his enemies "communists, socialists, and anarchists." American investments in Italy subsequently soared, both governmental and private.

Once again, free-market capitalism trumps any secondary notions of democracy. Alternately stated, for the architects of American geopolitical strategy, "democracy" means capitalism. According to the author, the United States has systematically favored policies designed to open up foreign economies to American investment, and active support of the nastiest anti-communist dictators has generally been the preferred choice over military intervention -- although war, too, has sometimes been "necessary." Griffin delivers the details on Cuba, Haiti, the Dominican Republic and various sovereign Latin American nations whose "inviolate" sovereignty was deemed secondary to American economic interests. Although other writers such as Robert Kagan present history showing the United States as admittedly a monster but a much nicer monster than the disastrous alternatives, Griffin gives extensive facts and arguments suggesting otherwise.

The author details the organization of the United Nations after WWII and how the great powers (permanent members of the Security Council) set it up as toothless so that their own imperialistic ambitions might not be thwarted. For example, the General Assembly cannot pass laws, but only resolutions, and these are only enforced if the Security Council so decides. Similarly, the World Court is impotent because its decisions are only enforced if all members of the Security Council are in agreement. The author concludes that the Cold War, the nuclear arms race and dozens of hot wars since 1945 were the consequence of the decisions made in San Francisco establishing the (relatively powerless) United Nations.

Subsequent to the founding of the United Nations came the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan for Europe, and the creation of the CIA through the National Security Act of 1947. The CIA was authorized to conduct clandestine operations in support of the Truman Doctrine's declared intention to promote "free governments," meaning capitalist-only governments (invariably alliances between big business and right-wing politicians) enabling untrammeled American business investment. The author describes at length how these policies and operations unfolded, sometimes in horrific detail, in countries like Greece, Italy, France, Turkey and Belgium after the War.

This is an excellent, comprehensive history of American imperialist behavior and a must read for students of modern geoeconomics.

Very thought provoking and well written. Asks lots of questions about what we think we know happened. A great book to get thorough knowledge even as a newbie to the subject.