I used this as a writing reference when it comes to the warmongering characters. This also helps with character charting to emulate historical figures. I recommend this book to anyone who loves history or looking for reference material for their novels.

Gods of War: History's Greatest Military Rivals, by James Lacey and Williamson Murray, is the best book I've read in a very long time, and I recommend it highly. If you do seek it out, however, you might benefit from my experience and read the Conclusion first, because I've just now realized that I missed the point of the book. It mostly pairs two military geniuses -- Hannibal v. Scipio, Napoleon v. Wellington, Lee v. Grant -- and explores how each succeeded or not, often with one man winning the battles while the other won the war. (The Second World War merits three generals: Rommel, Patton, and Montgomery.) But it seems that strategic vision isn't what interests Messrs Lacey and Williamson. Rather, they're arguing that, over the centuries, battles have become more complex and wars even more so, so that now it's impossible to imagine a "god of war" with the qualities of Ulysses Grant, who could not only comprehend and win battles and campaigns, but could wage and win a war that stretched across the thousand miles separating Vicksburg from Gettysburg.

The Union Army gave the world its first "industrial" war, prefiguring the great bloodlettings of 1914-1918 and 1939-1945. And Grant, the authors argue, was the last man able to cope with war's growing complexity. There were few outstanding generals in the First World War, and though there were some in the Second, it was actually the politicians -- Stalin, Churchill, and Roosevelt -- who won it. (And the politician Hitler who lost it, largely because he thought he knew better than his generals.)

Excellent reading. The author explains a wide range of important battles, the strategies employed by the generals leading the battles, and how those strategies affected the outcomes. Each battle is described in a short, concise chapter, that allows the reader to gain a lot of knowledge quickly. One can then chose the battles you were interested in for a more in depth study.

Free ARC from Net Galley

Great book that removes the proffered professionalism and/or genius to uncover personalities and overlooked events that while are often obscured by condensed versions of events are clearly brought out in this fascinating book. Bravo for great history and the lessons we can still learn from outstanding books like these!

READ ON!!

This book is well researched and well written. The authors' theory in the book is that wars are not decided by decisive battles, but on the strategy of generals. He covers a vast period of time starting with Hannibal's invasion of Italy and ending with World War II highlighting Patton, Rommel and Montgomery. While it is not as detailed as biographies on the indviduals, the authors give enough information to understand the main generals highlighted in the book.

This is a good book and I recommend it to anyone who is looking for a good read about the give and take between generals over time and a different theory on how war is won.

I received a free Kindle copy of this book courtesy of NetGalley and the publisher with the understanding that I would post a review on Net Galley, Goodreads, Amazon and my nonfiction book review blog. I also posted it to my Facebook  page.

I was recently provided with a copy of "Gods of War" by James Lacey and Murray Williamson for review. I am pleased to report that this fascinating and well written work contributes significantly to recent scholarship in Military History. Before looking at the details of formatting and so forth, it is worth noting that the thesis the authors are advancing is fundamentally that our fascination with the "Decisive Battle" often linked to the individual
"Great Captain" with a genius for war, is both misleading and rooted in our history prior to the influences of the Industrial Revolution and the French Revolution. The book examines military leaders generally regarded as outstanding and then demonstrates how few of them had quite as much genius at the strategic level as they are generally credited with as a consequence of their operational and tactical aptitudes. The authors approach their thesis by pairing off famous commanders, for example Grant and Lee or Caesar and Pompey, and demonstrating their thesis through examination of their best known battles. This is not a chronological chronicle of every significant battle in history, but the commanders chosen as well as the battles discussed, are very useful in enabling the reader to get a better grasp of their guiding principle. Their conclusion, following their illuminating discussion of Montgomery, Rommel and Patton, is that modern warfare, linked as it clearly is to technological and industrial change as well as sweeping changes in society rooted in the Enlightenment and the French Revolution, is too complex to be mastered at the strategic level by a single commander because there is simply too much information to be absorbed and collated. Modern warfare, and strategic success, requires a far more technocratic approach involving many different individuals and fields contributing to understanding the implications of battlefield failure or success. An example of this not working might be the American experience in Iraq and the Middle East following their smashing victories in Desert Storm. In other words, without a far more nuanced approach to strategic concerns than any single mind is likely to encompass, it is entirely possible to win a battle or war and lose the ensuing peace! Definate food for thought. The battlefield analyses of individual commanders and their experiences are both intriguing and thoroughly readable, especially for the avid student of military history.

This was a fascinating exploration of the make up of military genius. Unexplored the varying make up of some of the most respected military men of history. Anyone with an interest in the art of war wil find this book remarkable.