Has made a great addition to my collation of WW 1 very informative and would make a great present for anybody interested or studying this period of history?

Detailed but dry, David Stevenson's 1917 is a thoroughly researched political history of the fourth and penultimate year of the First World War. I enjoyed the international scope of the book, but felt that it got overly bogged down in the behind-the-scenes planning and political infighting, leaving very little room for narrative about the war itself or description of the battles and conditions. Rather than being strictly chronological, 1917 moves chapter by chapter in describing specific plot lines such as unrestricted submarine warfare or the Russian revolution. I think that this isn't a bad approach, but it's nonetheless hard to keep track of the dozens (or hundreds) of politicians and soldiers involved. Overall, the tone of the writing was a bit too dry for me, and I had to struggle through sections. I did enjoy the chapter on the role of India within the war and the chapter about the Balfour Declaration and the beginnings of the Jewish Homeland.

Those who are deeply interested in the history of World War 1 will likely enjoy this book, but it is likely too academic for the casual reader. I received a digital copy of this book for free from the publisher and was not required to write a positive review. The opinions I express in this review are entirely my own.

To me, David Stevenson’s new book, 1917, was an enigma. I was highly interested in it before beginning to read, I was immediately turned off for reasons that took a long while to sort out, and finally, near the end, Stevenson had partially redeemed himself. There are still numerous issues from the perspective of an amateur historian like me, but there are definitely qualities of Stevenson’s narrative that I found insightful and illustrative.

Stevenson’s 1917 is a deep dive into the major events of the titular year for the belligerent nations of World War I. It is not truly chronological, but instead each chapter covers a different event of the year, providing context and especially insight into the diplomatic or administrative aspects of each. In that way, it is sort of like a Decision Points for the world of 1917.

It is fair to begin with the negatives since that is where I began my journey through the book. I was interested in this book primarily because of the Russian Revolution, but also American entry into World War I and other key events that I knew of during 1917. The Russian Revolution (the October one, at least) does not feature prominently in this book (I imagine about 2–3% is spent on the Bolshevik Revolution), and even the February Revolution and the abdication of Nicholas II is treated more as a macroeconomic affair than anything else. In my years of reading, nothing has consistently failed to interest me more than macroeconomics.

I don’t often use the word “academic” as a pejorative, but I think that Stevenson’s book could be described as too academic for most audiences. First, it would take a very keen mind to keep all the names and labels straight unless you already knew something about Bethmann, Kerensky, Hindenburg and Ludendorff, Michaelis, and Sir Benjamin Robertson, for example. Maybe I am simply the wrong audience for this type of book, but I found it difficult to know who exactly was being referenced at any particular time and easily missed hundreds of mental connections as a result.

If it is written for anything near a popular audience, one usually finds in a book such as this an index containing an alphabetical list of major players with a short description of each so that they are more easily distinguishable. That would have been a helpful addition to such dense subject material. Another welcome supplement would have been a map for each chapter so that I would have been able to follow the troop movements, location references, and other geographical descriptors more efficiently. I still have no idea where Passchendaele is (OK I just googled it, so now I do), and I only have the vaguest clue for Caporetto. Yet entire chapters are devoted to battles at these locations. This is a problem. Maybe there are World War I enthusiasts out there laughing at my ignorance, and if so, please read this book. I truly think you will like it.

Honestly, these qualities of 1917 remind me of a professor from college who taught a course on the Song Dynasty of China. We’ve all had a similar teacher at some point. He (or she, but both current examples happen to be he) is simply too well-versed in a subject to bring true amateurs to her desired level. However, I would love to go back and take his Song China course now, having a more complete framework for Chinese history and having taught the importance of the Song to my AP students. I hope I can one day say the same of David Stevenson’s book. I hope I can come back to it and learn immensely more because of my existing framework of understanding.

Thankfully, as I was entering the final chapters of the book, I began to enjoy it a little more. The dense writing style didn’t dissipate, but I slowly began to appreciate the depth of historical research and wisdom that comprises this work. This is evident in skimming the bibliography, which is truly a thing to behold. There is no doubt that David Stevenson produces good history. The chapter on Greece, Brazil, Siam, and China entering the war hooked me back in a little, and the concluding chapter (Lenin’s revolution, the Ludendorff offensives, and Wilson’s Fourteen Points) was terrific. There was even one masterpiece of a sentence that brought seemingly disparate threads together, summarizing large chunks of the book:

Without American belligerency in fact — given that the February Revolution, Nivelle’s defeat and the French army mutinies, and a British financial and shipping crisis were all likely to have happened anyway — it is difficult to see how the Allies could have salvaged more than, at best, an unfavourable draw.
I cannot say that I always enjoyed reading Stevenson’s 1917. It is challenging, but I do know that I am ultimately glad I read it.

I couldn't finish it. I tried. I gave it my best effort, but it was just too dry. This coming from a history major no less! I'm used to reading dry and boring.

I received a free Kindle copy of 1917: War, Peace & Revolution by David Stevenson courtesy of Net Galley and Oxford University Press, the publisher. It was with the understanding that I would post a review to Net Galley, Goodreads, Amazon, Barnes and Noble and my nonfiction book review blog. I also posted it to my Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter and Google Plus pages.

I requested this book as I have read a number of books on World War I, but not one that focused on the critical year of 1917 by itself. This is the first book by David Stevenson that I have read.

This book, while immensely detailed, is well researched and written. It holds your interest while dealing into the decisions or nondecisions that prolonged World War I when there was some possibility of ending it sooner. It focuses on the time period of January through November of 1917 and deals with subjects as Germany's decision to escalate submarien warfare and the United States decision to finally give up its neutral status and join the war on the side of the Allies.

I recommend this book to anyone who has an interest in World War I and in particular the events of 1917 that ended up prolonging the war.

Thanks to the Oxford University Press and Netgalley for a copy of this book in exchange for an unbiased and honest review.
For students and old hands alike David Stevenson has produced a superb book guaranteed to get you thinking and adding a deeper understanding of the problems faced by the protagonists as WW1 dragged on and on. Read the book it pays dividends believe me and then check out the German authors on the subject. 1917 and the failing economy of Germany added to the fractured and betrayal of the German troops lays to first stone in the foundation of the Second World War's inevitability. Definitely one for the shelf..

Great background on a pivotal year and the events in Russia and America. The moves of these two countries or lack of moves in some cases escalated events at an unthought-of of pace. Deep history here.

1917: War, Peace, and Revolution by David Stevenson is the history of a single year of World War I. Stevenson studied for his undergraduate degree at the University of Cambridge, before receiving a Ph.D. from the same university. He became a Lecturer at the London School of Economics in 1982. In 1998, he was appointed Professor of International History. Between 2004 and 2005, he also received a Leverhulme Research Fellowship “for research on supply and logistics in 1914-1918”

The war had been fought to a stalemate for the last two and a half years. Its toll was growing on the population of Europe. England was near bankruptcy and running low on food. It required a great deal of imported food as well as oil to fuel its fleet. Germany was going through its turnip winter. The Russian population was suffering more than ever — food shortages, loss of life on the front, and a vodka ban. France was mostly self-sufficient in foodstuff, but it was being bled white. Germany remained effectively blockaded. It, in turn, tried to blockade England with unrestricted submarine warfare.

1917 was a year of risks and taking chances hoping for a breakthrough that would finally turn the tide of the war. England had turned to the United States supported convoys. Germany stepped up its submarine warfare knowing that it would bring the United States into the war. Germany underestimated US strength and overestimated its advantages of Russia leaving the war and its own submarines. Germany’s main ally the Austrian-Hungarian Empire was falling apart quickly and proving to be ineffective. England’s large navy remained essentially out of the war and its army was still small. France was bearing the burden of being the main army for the allies although the British commonwealths were fighting bravely.

Peace advances from the Vatican and Wilson were rejected by each side neither wanting to back down. There was the hope and belief that each side was nearing its breaking point and it was just a matter of time and lives before victory would be claimed. Russia’s exit from the war created a race to bring the US into the war before the German’s could transfer resources. In a further overestimation, Russia left the war giving Germany favorable terms because Russia thought the rest of Europe would fall into revolution shortly and differences from the hasty peace would be corrected with a communist Germany and Europe.

What makes this book on World War I special is that Steveson does not only concentrate on the Western Front. Germany’s invasion of Italy and Japan’s attack on German colonies and ships are covered. England’s request to Japan was accepted and German assets in China were attacked and Japan began to set itself up as a colonizing power in China. India is discussed as well as the British plan for a Jewish Homeland. It was during this year that Latin American countries joined the allies, mostly in word over deeds. Greece, Siam, and China would also join the allies in 1917. The European war became a world war.

1917 is a well-written history that goes deeper into World War I than most histories since it concentrates on a single year, although a pivotal year. 1917 set the stage for the war’s end and the uneasy peace to follow. It examines the many misconceptions that the warring countries held to and the belief that a decisive victory could be won.

Over the years, I have gone through periods of fascination (obsession?) with WW I, reading fiction and nonfiction. It’s always been something I never could quite get my hands around in terms of understanding – we learned in school about Archduke Franz Ferdinand, trench warfare, etc. but that was just skimming the surface. With the recent disaster surrounding U.S. involvement in the Middle East making me struggle to learn more about the history and reasons for the seemingly random carving up of the Middle East, I welcomed the opportunity to receive a copy of David Stevenson’s 1917 from Oxford University Press and NetGalley in exchange for my honest review.

Stevenson, a renowned WW I scholar and historian at the London School of Economics and Political Science, has several previous books including Armaments and the Coming of War: Europe, 1904-1914 (1996), 1914-1918: The History of the First World War (2004), and With Our Backs to the Wall: Victory and Defeat in 1918 (2011). Clearly he is up to the task of presenting his readers with the facts about the events of this pivotal year.

But this is more than just facts. The full title of the book is 1917: War, Peace, and Revolution, and while it focuses on how events in one year can transform history, it also examines what made the war escalate in subsequent years. Stevenson focuses on two areas in particular: the Russian Revolution and American intervention. He looks at key decisions that were made along the way, including the German campaign of “unrestricted” submarine warfare, he official declaration of war by the U.S. in response, the abdication of Russian Tsar Nicholas II, and Britain’s actions in the ill-fated Third Battle of Ypres.

In addition to his close look at 1917, Stevenson points out the consequences involving other countries (including, India, Brazil, China the promise of a Jewish national home in Palestine). Both military history and political history are included and, as noted above, Russia and the U.S get the prime focus.

TBH, this book is awesome but may have been even more than I needed to know about 1917! For anyone with a particular interest in this time period, or wanting to delve into the root causes and trace the horrible branches of turmoil that continue to this day in the Middle East, this book will be treasured. Superb history! Five stars.

This is primarily a book for the academic historian rather than a cross-over book with popular appeal. Stevenson has marshalled a clear and detailed narrative that looks not just at the crucial year of 1917 within the overarching pattern of WW1, but specifically at decision-making and the interaction of those results.

Organised around three main threads, this explores the German decision to launch unrestricted submarine war through the use of U-boats; the abdication of Tsar Nicholas II and the subsequent impact on the Allies' campaigns; and the renewed globalisation of the war bringing in the US, of course, but also China.

The writing tends to the dry but makes extensive use of contemporary records, giving a good first-handedness to the story. Best for the engaged professional historian or student.

As the year of the German resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare, the Zimmerman Telegram and US entry into the First World War; Passchendaele or Third Ypres, Cambrai, and the mutinies in the French Army following the failed Nivelle offensive on the Western Front; the defeat of Italy at Caporetto; the February and October revolutions in Russia; and the Balfour Declaration, 1917 was clearly a pivotal year not only in the Great War but in global history, and in David Stevenson, who has already written or edited several books about the causes, course or consequences of the First World War it clearly has an author well qualified to do it justice.

His book, ‘1917. War, Peace, and Revolution’, is not intended to cover everything but instead resembles Arno Mayer’s ‘Political Origins of the New Diplomacy, 1917-18’, in centring on the way in which American intervention and revolution in Russia impacted upon the war, although it was not of course until 1918 that American troops started arriving in France in large numbers or until the March 1918 Treaty of Brest-Litovsk that Russia formally withdrew from the conflict (Ludendorff’s Spring 1918 offensive representing the last chance for Germany to effect a knock-out blow in the West before the odds turned irredeemably against her).

In particular Stevenson is concerned to detail the elite decision-making processes which resulted in the war grinding on, rather than pursuing seemingly less perilous and painful options. In this context Stevenson’s treatment of the former Foreign Secretary Lord Lansdowne is somewhat surprising.

Lansdowne appears in Stevenson’s List of Principal Personalities and indeed his book begins by quoting Lansdowne addressing the British Cabinet in November 1916 to the effect that those who needlessly prolong the war bear as heavy a responsibility as those who needlessly provoked it, but the Lansdowne letter of 29 November 1917 gets a single sentence and there is no mention at all of the formation of the Lansdowne Committee to support his proposal of a negotiated peace, let alone the formation in Germany of an active group of independent moderates, led by Dr. Kurt Hahn (the future founder of Gordonstoun) to persuade their government to respond positively to Lansdowne’s initiative. It might be argued that this makes sense insofar as this peace offensive had no positive results but the same point could be made in the military context in relation to Passchendaele, yet Stevenson devotes an entire chapter to that particular mud-caked exercise in futility.

Historical events and themes rarely coincide neatly with the units by which we measure time and Stevenson’s ‘1917’ focuses on the months of January to November in that year, as well as more broadly engaging with the period December 1916 to March 1918. The book itself is engaging and informative, resting as it does upon an academic lifetime’s reflection as well as impressive and judicious use of archival and secondary literature, although the avowedly selective bibliography finds no space for the work of John Keegan or Niall Ferguson and makes no mention of the admittedly more obscure but highly germane six articles collectively entitled ‘Searching for peace, 1914-1918’ by David Woodward, Arthur S. Link, James Joll, Harold Kurtz, Hugh Seton-Watson, and Robert Blake respectively, which were originally broadcast on the Third Programme and then published in ‘The Listener’ between the 9th and the 14th of July 1966.