A detailed and factual account of a number of key attacks on the German Atlantic fortifications, following the D-Day invasion, The author clearly understands the very complex and daunting prospect of attacking German defences-in-depth in the German held fortified ports. along the Atlantic coast
The book could have been improved by including more eye witness accounts from both the defenders and attackers perspectives. Some of the combat must have been truly horrific, but it was glossed over by using statistics and dry facts. I fully understand the immense difficulty of locating surviving veterans. even when the book was first written in 2001. I would have loved to have had one of the battles described in a more personal manner, detailing the individual events that had taken place.
From a military history reference perspective, the books ticks all the boxes.

Although the 1942 Dieppe Raid was a massive failure it did teach the Allies some valuable lessons, foremost of which was that attempting to capturing a Channel port on D-Day was best avoided, if at all possible. Necessity being the mother of invention, Churchill came up with the inspired idea of building a port rather than capturing one. Hence supplies and reinforcements for the Normandy operation were primarily delivered at two Mulberries: a Mulberry being an artificial harbour made up of 600-ton prefabricated concrete caissons, which were towed into place and sunk as breakwaters.

More than 500,000 troops and 80,000 vehicles were landed at the two Mulberry harbours before a storm destroyed the Omaha Beach one and severely damaged the other at Gold Beach. This development, and the exponential increase in men and supplies as the Normandy bridgehead expanded, meant that it became increasingly urgent for ground troops to capture one or more working ports and this is the interesting story examined in Patrick Delaforce’s ‘Smashing Hitler’s Atlantic Wall’, a book first published in 2001, which has now been reprinted by Thistle Publishing.

Bizarrely the front cover is illustrated by a picture of a depth charge exploding, which bears no obvious relation to the book’s contents but then neither, really, does the title, as Hitler’s Atlantic Wall had already been breached on D-Day. The book’s subtitle – ‘The Destruction of the Nazi Coastal Fortresses’ – is a bit better, although the Allied ideal was actually to persuade garrisons to surrender so that port facilities could be captured intact and put into Allied service as quickly as possible.

The next problem is the book’s first sentence - “The five years of global warfare during World War Two can be likened to a three-dimensional deadly game of chess” - although I guess that most people approaching this book will be aware that the Second World War actually ran for six years.

The author is on much firmer ground as the book proceeds and has the advantage of having been a participant of some of the events he chronicles, insofar as he was part of the armoured division that captured Antwerp. He therefore has a personal stake in highlighting this important series of operations which tend to be downplayed in relation to D-Day or the breakout from Normandy.

Delaforce’s bibliography has no place for more recent publications, such as Mark Zuehlke’s ‘Terrible Victory’ or ‘Attack on the Scheldt’ by Graham A. Thomas but is not a completely reliable guide even to earlier publications (‘Battle of the Scheldt’ by W. Denis Whitaker and Shelagh Whitaker is represented as Denis Whitaker’s ‘Battle for the Scheldt’). Nevertheless, for all its not inconsiderable faults this book, if only through lack of competition, still represents the best single volume for the non-specialist on this particular aspect of World War Two.