This book is a very clear and concise explanation of the rebirth of populism, nationalism, and socialism in the age of globalization. It is a single edited volume of three separate books by the author. The author is an engaging writer who shows why and how these ideologies have become ever more prevalent in the past two decades. Citing various major events from the rise of terrorism to the 2008 Financial Crisis, Judis examines the tumultuous politics of our time providing historical context and makes it clear why the tension between these ideologies will persist until a transformation in government arises. The book is a must-read for anyone looking to make sense of disparate world political events.

This is a very scholarly read and somewhat over my head. It is about not just the U.S. but political and economic systems of many countries.
I did enjoy the parts about Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump. I agree with the author that Bernie was our best chance to have Democratic Socialism in our country, though Elizabeth was close too, no matter what she called it.
This is a very in depth book and I will admit that I got lost in it at times. It could be a good text book. It was however worth my time.

A good, informative read. I learned quite a bit. I now am more aware of positions on both the left and the right. Could have been shorter and still made the same points.

This is a very interesting and timely books that provides a good context on the current rise of populism across the world, As a public policy student, I found the book extremely useful.

A collection of three earlier works by Judis on populism, nationalism, and socialism in America and Western Europe. Of course, as expected from this type of work, the author writes as if these places are the center of the world or possibly, the world itself. There is no mention of any Eastern European or Balkan country. All of them are lumped into the Eastern Europe category and pretty much nothing whatsoever about Asia except for China...

An interesting and up-to-date overview of the last few decades of Western politics. The author describes and analyzes three most important movements: populism, nationalism and socialism. They all bloomed in response to the popular disillusionment with capitalism and neoliberalism, which I share, so it was an interesting read. It is also worth mentioning that the author’s focus goes beyond national US politics, because these movements are more global phenomena.

Thanks to the publisher, Columbia Global Reports, and NetGalley for the advance copy of this book.

I did not realize this was a compilation of Judis' previous works on contemporary politics. I had read them earlier, and recommend them. This book is updated with the 2020 election; I recommend this to have all of his work together in one volume

Thought this was an excellent and useful insight into our current politics. It was a little long at times, but that's okay.

This is a really interesting book on three political ideologies, tactics, or whatever you want to call the, that have recently come back with a vengeance. Little of the material in here is new, as each section was earlier published as a stand-alone book over the course of the past three years, but there is some synthesis that adds a little bit of novelty to the text for those who have already ready the other three or are weighing to get one or two of the three in place of this text.

Throughout the course of the book, Judis takes the time to define each idea, populism, nationalism, and socialism, in a contemporary context while layering it with the origins and development of these ideas in the United States and Western Europe.

The first of the three major concepts that Judis spends time on is populism. Judis rightfully views the emergence of populist campaigns and parties as symptoms of deep political crisis. To him, although populism is fundamentally a political movement to pit "average people" against elites, he also finds it necessary to define a difference between left populism and right populism. To him, left populism is "diadic," meaning that there are two groups pitted against one another--the people and the elites. Left populism is different from orthodox socialisim and social democracy is that it is neither class-based nor anti-capitalist. On the other hand, right populism is "triadic," meaning that the people punch at two separate groups: the elites, and an out-group that are "coddled" by elites, whether they be immigrants, a minority group, and so on. Right populism also notably does not bring the "people" to identify with businesses classes against critics, nor do they side with authoritarian conservatives who want to subvert democracy--they see themselves as fundamentally democratic.

I'm not sure that this conceptualization of "tradic" is fundamental to right-populism, as there are plenty of cases where right populism has been diadic as well. I'm also skeptical of the idea that right-populists neither identify with business classes (who else would redirect their rage at the "outgroup?"). In addition, the idea that they don't side with authoritarian conservatives who wish to subvert democracy seems suspect from cases of the 1920s and 1930s, as well as the January 6 Capitol Riot. Perhaps I'm being too hard on right populists and not hard enough on left populists, but this seems to be a huge failing of the book.

The historical section of populism also seems to be lacking, as Judis states that populism is an inherently American creation that spread later to Latin America and Europe, especially with the rise of the American People's Party. This is absolute nonsense. Populism is a feature of all democratic states that fall into crisis throughout modern history, and the crisis is a result of people feeling un- or under-represented. For instance, the French Boulanger Affair is a clear-cut case of European populism which took place <i>before</i> the rise of the American People's Party. The same is true of supporters of Napoleon III. At the same time, little time is spent on the populist appeals of Jacksonian democracy in the United States.

In his section of nationalism, Judis takes an almost-but-not-quite constructivist view of national identity. He argues that "national identity is not just a product of where a person is born or immigrated to, but of deeply held sentiments that are usually acquired during childhood." That being said, Judis finds that politicans and policymakers ignore national identity at their peril and they should not be viewed exclusively as right-wing excesses. Instead, attempts to subvert weaker forms of nationalism tend to cause explosions in extreme nationalism. On this, Judis is scathing towards cosmopolitan critics--rightfully so--who vilify nationalism while simultaneously doing little to address the "cricumstances that [...] provoked these sentiments." By "circumstances," Judis clearly means globalization of capital, increasing immigration, and the self-isolation of cosmopolitan cities, which tend to have a stronger relationship with other cosmopolitan cities--even beyond the borders of the nation--than areas which might be considered the interior. A cosmopolitan in New York likely feels closer to a cosmopolitan in London or Paris than to someone in Wichita or Butte.

Ultimately, in this section, Judis is a defender of the nation and the modern nation-state in both Europe and the United States. While he's also sympathetic to international institutions like the United Nations and the European Union, he finds that the role of these institutions should be to <i>uphold</i> national sovereignty, rather than to subvert it. If I'm going to be honest, I felt derision among reading this section for the first time, but Judis's appeals to a social democratic vision of nationhood made me feel a bit more sympathetic. He is right when he states that permanently open borders would make the post-Depression welfare state entirely untenable for a number of reasons. First, the financial resources would not exist to sustain these institutions. Second, welfare state institutions are built on trust between citizens who share--at least somewhat similar--culture and way of life. Conservatives effectively dismantled a large portion of the New Deal and Great Society welfare state by fostering mistrust by white citizens of black citizens, who were framed as abusing the welfare state with "welfare queens" and other Reaganist nonsense. Although there was little to no truth in these claims, the rhetoric mattered, and if people feel that they don't belong in the same community as others, they are far less likely to want to grant the state legitimacy in supporting those others. That isn't to say immigration should be cut--the United States, for instance, NEEDS comprehensive immigration reform and to offer a path to undocumented citizens--but national borders are still essentially necessary to preserving the welfare state.

That being said, I think Judis's use of the term "nationalism" in this section is sticky. It amounts to a defense of nationalism, but I think what leftists tend to think of "nationalism" is fundamentally national-populism--in the same vein as Trumpism, Britain First, the National Rally in France, etc.--while the subject could be better framed as "patriotism" or some other, better concept. This is especially true when he discusses socialism--especially "socialist nationalism" in the next section, which is simply an inversion of "national socialism," or Nazism. These are not the same thing and the use of language needs to be better constructed here.

While Judis's section on populism was the best, and his section of nationalism the worst, his section on socialism is middling. Although initially an orthodox Marxist, Judis has shifted in views and is effectively an ardent supporter of Bernie Sanders's conception of "21st Century Socialism." Although Sanders originally saw himself a successor to Eugene Debs, he has shifted to what would have been the "conservative" wing of the American Socialist Party in pre-New deal America. Now, his policies are much more in line with Milwaukee's famous "sewer socialism" of incremental reforms to (re)build the American welfare state. He finds that the British Labour Party should follow this direction as well. That being said, he pulls no punches when talking about the leadership of the Democratic Socialists of America (DSA). While the DSA and a post-Sanders movement has the potential to sweep America the same way that Movement Conservatism did in the late 1970s and 1980s, it is going to have to moderate a number of its positions. I agree with Judis on this, and find that democratic socialism in America today is comparably where Movement Conservatism was in the late 1960s--winning its first successes. The problem with the DSA leadership and the media mouthpiece of American socialists, Jacobin Magazine, is that there are too many orthodox Marxists who find revolutionary politics necessary and/or the only way. They are also uncompromising and deeply radical on a number of issues that alienate the electorate--especially proposals like defunding the police, which the average American sees as a threat to their safety.

The DSA and its followers are in a moment where they have the potential to win sweeping victories. After last summer's Black Lives Matter protests, increasing numbers of Americans have come to agree that policy initiatives for greater racial equality is necessary. With the pandemic, Americans see the welfare state as increasingly necessary. After January 6, right-wing claims to sole ownership of "patriotism" have come under question. With modest policy positions, the position of the DSA could seriously rise, but Judis argues that they are far too uncompromising. "Defund the police" will not win moderates that otherwise agree with DSA-backed candidates. Clamoring for open borders and untrammeled cosmopolitanism will also not win voters. Finally, the DSA's leadership refused to compromise by endorsing Joe Biden, who has a significantly more progressive cabinet than Barack Obama did ten years ago. Judis sees these things as a serious problems to making 21st Century American socialism palatable, and so do I. DSA needs to take a more social-democratic line without giving in to neoliberalism the same way that the British Labour Party, French Socialists, or German Social Democratic Party did in the 1990s.

When I first began to read this book, I thought it would make a good piece to include in a class on the Origins of Contemporary Issues if I have the opportunity to teach it again. Broadly, I still think this is the case, but there are also the issues I named above. I also generally prefer to teach with a world-historical perpsective, and the exclusive focus on the United States and Europe weakens my resolve to use this text.

John Judis, the author of "The Politics of Our Time" is only a left-wing ideologue who is masquerading as an intellectual. Thus, his book stinks to high heaven! Do not waste your time on this book.