The Decisive Decade: American Grand Strategy for Triumph Over China is an expansive new book from consultant and scholar Jonathan D.T. Ward. It examines America’s readiness for competition and conflict with China, arguing that America must reinvigorate its grand strategy to maintain its global leadership position. As the relationship between the U.S. and China chafes against their fundamentally different political systems and undergoes an uncomfortable process of decoupling, Ward maintains that the economic, diplomatic and military sectors must work together to pull America “out of a time of danger and toward a new path: a path to victory.” Speaking of the economic containment of China, Ward states “the most important objective in the decade ahead is to transform the contest with China into one we can win. While this contest is unlikely to end in the 2020s, this decade will be decisive, one in which we must make the most important adjustments.” This book makes a number of suggestions for those adjustments.

The author’s extensive knowledge of Russian history supports his thorough examination of how the U.S. has faced similar important challenges in the past and how this economic warrior spirit might be revived today. The first section discusses the need for a new economic strategy, looking back to see how effectively the U.S. aligned the aims of the government with private industry during previous conflicts. It condemns the partnerships between China and U.S. multinationals which are “… tied to China’s genocide and military build-up.” Worse yet, unlike in previous conflicts, it is now America’s adversary which has the industry and infrastructure to support their aims in a strategic conflict.

The Decisive Decade explains the current state of the US-China economic relationship, the nature of their competition and provides a comprehensive overview of the people who must work together to maintain America’s global leadership position. He joins a chorus of security analysts expressing concern over how China has advanced by using U.S. technology and intellectual property to compete with the US. He refers to previous US-China engagement as allowing China to “prey upon” U.S. innovation, capital and technology. What The Decisive Decade does most effectively is show how America’s response must be a unified force of government and private industry.

He opposes the popular notion that economic interdependence can serve as an infallible deterrent against conflict. While recognising that it can serve as a stabilising factor, he refers to the international relations book The Great Illusion (1909), which argued that a costly European war was unlikely to start and if it did, would not last long. It would be excellent to read an expansion upon these ideas examining whether policy makers and business executives are still sleep walking through arrangements with the Chinese market with hopes that economic ties can smooth over political frictions and a disingenuous belief that global trade will automatically lead to democracy.

It briefly acknowledges the benefits of so many Chinese people having been lifted out of poverty and says that it was U.S. markets, technology, capital and institutions which made that rise possible. This argument is not likely to be well received by some. Now that the Chinese people are doing well enough, Ward argues, the U.S. must regain its place in engaging with emerging markets. It provides an overview of the threats and opportunities in different countries and regions, reminding us that “… the United States has not prioritized economic integration and investment at the scale that China has, and it has not engaged our private sector in global strategic initiatives in a way that is already common to China’s system of global economic expansion.” Outside of the U.S. democratic alliances, key aims are provided for the essential regions of the Indo-Pacific, Africa and Latin America. This was an excellent analysis which presented information on a number of countries that are often overlooked.

One of the strengths of this book is the author’s ability to offer practical recommendations for policy makers, business leaders and private enterprises. He outlines how businesses and U.S. administrations have underestimated the geopolitical risks associated with the CCP. He highlights the need for long term vision, with associated long term budgets, to contain and deter aggression from China. This includes suggesting changes for the tech industry, capital markets and supply chains. As someone originally from a paradigmatic Rust Belt city, I’m typically pessimistic about any calls to “rebuild America.” I appreciated the desire to maintain America’s technological edge, the outlines of tech trends and the list of new national industrial strategies, but I’m not convinced that the topics discussed were truly to “rebuild America,” but rather “fortify Northern California.”

Many of the sections focusing on American companies lament what they must do to accommodate China and its political system. There is much discussion of what they should do and must understand, such as “Our business leaders must understand that they are vital to American victory in the economic contest with Beijing.” Accommodating China seems to be directed toward the tech industry in particular, but this book really shines when it turns its focus toward Wall Street. It criticises the “numerous investment vehicles that pour American and global capital into China, seeking a return on China’s economic growth.” It seems that this will require a massive overhaul of the entire system. What do we say to new MBAs who are told to maximize profits? Where should people work when the best opportunities, or the only stable work opportunities, are connected in some way to the Chinese market? It’s not the job of a defence contractor or construction equipment manufacturer to anticipate and respond to national security needs rather than market incentives. The Decisive Decade shows that it will require a true shift, stemming from the government, to provide incentive for a change in investment. After reading this book, it appears most influential business leaders refuse to believe that the time of ‘engagement’ with the Chinese market is over and will not deeply consider the possibility of conflict between the two nations.

The Decisive Decade is written with a sense of urgency and repeatedly reminds us how the U.S. and its democratic allies awakening to the nightmare posed by this “adversary state.” The concise sections calling for action are unfortunately dragged down by excessive, multi-page quotations. The US-China space is highly emotionally charged, so there is room for the use of direct quotes from speeches and written material to ensure absolute clarity. However, some information could have been summarised or rephrased without the direct inclusion of multi-page lists or mission statements. Ward’s own voice is occasionally lost by his use of extremely long quotations from other Chinese economic scholars.

Overall, The Decisive Decade is clearly written with material that is accessible to a wide range of readers. Yet, there were some sections where information moved from the specific to the general and this may put off some readers. For example, he provides some details about the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) at the beginning of the book which assumes the reader has a certain level of knowledge on this topic, but then explains more general issues with BRI, such as making much of the world dependent on China, toward the second half of the book. This makes it difficult to position this book for reader recommendations.
Occasionally there are claims in the book about the feelings of the Chinese people that appear to be unfounded, if not in the realm of wishful thinking. For example, “The older generation among China’s people understand that their rulers bring tragedy and devastation through their ambitious plans.” He lists a series of events ranging from the Korean War to Tiananmen Square, but does not provide a source for this suggestion that the “older generation” feels any certain way politically or another. The statement is left hanging without further support.

Despite being a cautionary collection of internal and external threats, the overarching theme of this book is faith in America’s innovative potential. It acknowledges the shared movements made by the Trump and Biden administrations and is a rousing call for action for those working in government, the tech industry and finance to contain China’s geopolitical ambitions. Doubtless some readers may disagree with the heavy tones of American exceptionalism (complete with an inserted copy and paste of the Bill of Rights), however it is a valuable contribution to the ongoing debate over the economic bifurcation of the U.S. and China, especially within the global technology sector. Overall, The Decisive Decade is recommended for those interested in U.S. foreign policy and financial policy as a means of containment. Unlike many other recent publications on US-China relations, it has a unique focus on transport, logistics, procurement, supply chains and trading systems. It offers valuable insights and stern warnings for business and financial leaders who are desperate to avoid acknowledging the downward spiral in US-China relations.

This book was provided by Diversion Books for review.

While I am glad I had the opportunity to read this book, it is absolutely out of my educational understanding, but I feel I learned some about the serious threat China poses to our way of life,
I don’t think most average American readers would be interested in this much information, even
when presented in such a well thought out but complicated way.
I’d watched Dr. Ward interviewed on World News Tonight and he made the book seem like
a perfect primer for a well read person. I found. I had to look up a lot of vocabulary that would
never appear in. my world, but I enjoy learning about language.
China is clearly a huge threat to our way of life, and I plan to continue to learn about global affairs.
I just won’t choose a book by its cover.
I would recommend this book to readers with a foundation in geo-politics and foreign relations.
My thanks to Diversion Books and Net Galley for providing this book in exchange for my honest review, which I give voluntarily.

Jonathan Ward correctly identifies Xi Jinping, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the People's Liberation Army (PLA), and the People's Republic of China (PRC) as America's number one adversary today, but then his goes off the rails offering economic and military policies that have always failed when they have been tried before. A clear picture of our nation's greatest enemy follows:
CHINA IS A PAPER TIGER -- When one examines all of the relevant Chinese metrics, but since the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) often hides its actual statistics and releases only incorrect numbers, it becomes necessary to also look at other applicable surrogate data sets. When this is done, it becomes clear that the Asian Dragon is just a Paper Tiger.
MILITARY READINESS -- Reliable data on the People's Liberation Army (PLA) are not publicly available; Russia's Red Army, which invaded Ukraine one year ago, is the best available alternative evidence. Both China and Russia are totalitarian regimes with dictatorial leaders and centrally planned economic systems, and each authoritarian government suffers from widespread inefficiencies and rampant graft. Given Russia's severe lack of success so far in Ukraine, the world now has its first honest look at the utter absence of coordination and planning of the armed forces of a despotic government. For example, it has been reported that up to 60% of Russia's precition weapons are duds.
An army must have food, ammunition for its soldiers, gasoline, and repair parts for its modern fighting vehicles. Russia has proven to be wholly deficient in every category. Hungry infantrymen, no working ammunition for its aircraft, a complete absence of fuel, and zero spare parts. So far, Mr. Putin has bombarded Ukrainian civilians with countless rockets, but this may soon come to an end since the factory that makes these missiles reportedly has an annual production capacity of only 120 new missiles yearly. This fact, coupled with the reality that many of these warheads miss their intended targets or often fail to detonate on impact, tells the truth about the reliability of Russian war-making equipment. Russia's source for new tanks demonstrates its lack of replacement equipment and spare parts. Russia has only one company that manufactures tanks, and its annual production capacity is only 250 armored vehicles annually. The Ukrainians have already destroyed a countless number of Russia's tanks. Even worse, this lone Russian tank factory has shut down production due to a lack of parts, attributable to the West's economic sanctions. Given the almost complete logistical failure, Russian troops abandon perfectly serviceable tanks left and right. Russia has already had to use commercial trucks to deliver supplies to its front-line soldiers because Russia's military logistical capabilities are borderline useless. Even more compelling is that the Russian Airforce has thus far been unable to gain or maintain air superiority over Ukraine, and many Russian pilots refuse to leave Russian airspace. Morale among Mr. Putin's ground forces is so low that the conscripts in many units refuse to follow orders, and many of Russia's top generals have died when they moved very near the front lines to spur their troops to advance. The entire situation in Ukraine reminds me of the famous picture from the old days in the USSR of a string of brand-new farm tractors sitting idle and rusting next to vast fields of unharvested grain due to the absence of the necessary gasoline.
ENERGY -- China is the world's largest importer of petroleum and natural gas, and over recent decades, their domestic supplies have risen almost not at all. Most of China's imported natural gas comes via pipelines from Russia and Kazakhstan. But nearly 80% of China's crude oil imports come via the sea, and almost all of this crude oil moves on tankers that traverse the Strait of Malacca, which is 500 miles long and at its choke point just 40 miles wide. A blockade could be quickly instituted and maintained by a handful of surface vessels from India, Australia, or the US in a short interval of time, China's economy and military would come to an abrupt halt. China possesses a 600-ship surface navy, and Xi Jinping might attempt to open the Strait of Malacca by force, but most of China's fleet are small vessels unable to travel further South than Vietnam.
Moreover, a secondary quarantine could be instituted at the Strait of Hormuz, which would deprive China of up to 50% of its imported oil that comes from the Middle East. These two tactics would result in the PLA's troops starving on Taiwan's beaches. Xi Jinping fully understands this fatal strategic reality and has ordered his minions to find alternative routes for this critical resource. An important side note is that China's interest in taking the South China Sea into its orbit is mostly due to that area's energy reserves. The South China Sea contains about 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and 11 billion barrels of crude petroleum that the CCP desperately needs.
FOOD -- China imports over $100 billion of foodstuffs annually. Given its massive size, China has only a tiny portion of arable land. Therefore, China already can not feed its citizens. On a wartime footing, tens of thousands of Chinese citizens that the CCP lords over would quickly begin starving to death. China grows food on every hectare of arable land and still can not feed its people. Thus China is far from food self-sufficient. Indeed, Xi Jinping asked that all Chinese eat less to conserve foodstuffs, yet there are repeated reports of grain and vegetables rotting in CCP storehouses and in piles beside the roads.
ENVIRONMENT -- During the reign of Mao Tse Tung, the CCP raped China's industrial heartland in Manchuria, and since 1976 after Mao's death, little has changed. This has left China with a significant rust belt in its Northeast quadrant. Air pollution continues so bad that Xi ordered many of China's factories to close during the 2022 Winter Olympics. Most of China's rivers and streams are so polluted that most of China's water is useless. The quantity of potable water per Chinese citizen roughly equals the available potable water for each Saudi Arabian citizen.
ECONOMY -- After rapid growth over four decades after Mao's death, China's economic dynamism has already slowed dramatically and will soon begin to contract. Ergo, the window through which China might successfully invade Taiwan is quickly closing. China claims its GDP increased by 4.8% during the first quarter of 2022, but a recent scientific study of China's nighttime electricity usage found that the PRC's actual GDP may be be 60% lower than China's official statistics. Therefore, meeting China's targetted growth rate for 2023 will be difficult, if not impossible. The US debt to GDP ratio has only exceeded 100% two times in our history -- during WWII and today. Compare this with China's current debt-to-GDP ratio, which is over 300%. This leads one to believe that a financial collapse may soon be in store, and the bankruptcies of Evergrande and many other Chinese companies bear testament to this potential outcome.
DEMOGRAPHY -- China is facing a massive demographic time bomb. Soon there will be too few workers in China to support China's fast-growing elderly population. China's one-child policy set this problem in motion, but even as the CCP today allows for two or three children, China's birth rate has only continued to decline. Coupled with increased longevity among the existing Chinese, China faces a towering problem. If Xi Jinping does not want the dead bodies of China's elderly in the streets, he will have to divert about one-third of China's annual budget to increased care for the elderly, leaving little or no funds for the PLA. The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences estimates that this problem will take full effect by 2027, most independent demographers point to an earlier date, and a few insist that this irreversible trend has already begun. China has also admitted that it over counted 100 million of its younger workers. Soon China will be unable to supply both guns and butter,
CONTAINMENT -- China is surrounded by many nations in East Asia and has only two allies -- Russia (which may soon be on the way to collapse) and Pakistan, which is, at best, only a fragile nation. Arrayed against China are the USA, UK, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, New Zealand, the Philippines, Vietnam, Australia, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, and India. After the first Chinese missile hits Taiwan, China will be immediately cut off from all of its military sources of supply (except for some natural gas and oil from Russia and Kazakhstan from China's east), and China's vaunted PLA will quickly grind to a halt. China can not prevail in an invasion of Taiwan, where almost all of its regional neighbors oppose such an undertaking.
Richard W. Burcik is the author of two short nonfiction books, "The DNA Lottery" and "Anatomy of a Lie."