Anti-Logical and Anti-Truthful Treatise
Ludwig Wittgenstein; Alexander Boot, translator, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus: Logical-Philosophical Treatise (New York: Penguin Book, May 13, 2025). EBook: $16. 144pp, 5-1/16X7-3/4. ISBN: 979-0-241-48417-3.
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“One of the greatest philosophical works of all time, in a new translation for the twenty-first century… A succinct yet wide-ranging exploration of language and logic, science and mysticism, which has inspired generations of thinkers, artists and poets. In a series of short, bold statements, Wittgenstein seeks to define the limits of language, its relation to logic, its power and its inherent failings. Originally published in the early 1920s, it is the only book-length work the renowned philosopher published in his lifetime… Wittgenstein’s gem-like prose—at once specialist and, often, remarkably plain-spoken—considering his background in mechanical engineering, while highlighting the underlying poetry of this seminal text.”
It is impossible for me not to mention that my recent research into ghostwriters has proven that most writers who only mention to write a single book in a lifetime are likely to have purchased this text from a ghostwriter. A professional writer is incapable of writing a single book, and then remaining silent for the rest of their life. Ludwig Wittgenstein lived to be 62 (1889-1951). Apparently, he also published two short pieces during his life. And the rest was published posthumously from manuscripts attributed to this guy. Again, texts that are attributed to “authors” for the first time after their deaths are very likely to be ghostwritten. When somebody dies this generates sympathy for them from the public, so assigning new books to their now famous byline tends to generate more sales. And the dead do not collect royalties, leaving more money for an editor, or ghostwriter.
This book is rather short for a Penguin classic: under 100 pages in the main theoretical text. The “Introduction” argues that Ludwig sold this text to a publisher, Der Brenner, in 1919 by claiming he finished it in the “previous year, just before being captured and interned as a prisoner of war”, having worked on it across the previous “seven years”. It seems likely that the editor of Der Brenner was involved in a potential ghostwriting because its editor, Ficker, “assisted Wittgenstein earlier, in 1914, with the distribution of a sizeable portion of his inheritance among artists ‘in need’.” In other words, Wittgenstein seems to have bribed Ficker 5 years earlier by sponsoring his ghostwriting for other “artists”, and then when he was in need, he asked for Ficker to bolster his reputation after a capture by probably ghostwriting, and publishing this philosophical work. But then, readers are informed that Ficker sent a leading response, but still refused to publish, along with many other rejections. Oddly, after seemingly 2 years of sending out an unedited manuscript to numerous publishers, when it was published with “misprints and typographic errors… he disowned it.” This is yet another strong piece of evidence for ghostwriting (though perhaps not by Ficker) because those who deny authorship of a text when it is criticized are very likely to indeed not have written it. This text only gained fame in 1922 when an English translation smoothed out its glitches in a rewriting (vi-viii). More evidence of ghostwriting is that Wittgenstein was “reclusive” (ix): those who have others write their intellectual labors are not likely to want to discuss their potential ignorance with reporters, or scholars seeking them out.
“A sentence that is true will correspond to a way the world actually is; one that is false will correspond to a way that it could be but isn’t; a meaningless, or sense-less, use of language will sketch a combination of model-elements that isn’t possible” (x).
The rest of the introduction is less clear. There is a straightforward biography of the author. But sections explaining his theory are too convoluted to explain things to a reader coming to this author for the first time. From what is stated, it seems that Wittgenstein championed nonsense theory, such as: “the logic of facts does not allow itself to be represented”. In a 1919 letter he elaborated that the “cardinal problem of philosophy” is that there are some propositions that can be expressed through “language” and “thought”, while others can “only” be “shown”. The editor comments this means that philosophical models use propositions with “form” that can be displayed, but not represented. In other words, this philosopher cannot explain in words what he is trying to say, and this is his point (xxiii-xxiv).
A section on “Truth-Function Notation” explains one aspect of Wittgenstein’s theory. The letters p and q represent two different propositions in the following set of logicians’ possible thought structures: 1. Combination (or conjunction): p and q; 2. Alternation (or disjunction): p or q; 3. Negation not p (that is, it is not the case that p); or, 4. Material implication: if p, then q. When these p and q values are assigned either true or false, the combination of these possible values derive what Wittgenstein refers to as the “truth-functional”. One of them can be true, and the other false, both can be false, or both can be true; then, in combination 3 of them together would be false and only one true. These standard logical rules are subverted to ask if even nonsensical “thought” is by “its essence… logical”. A “necessary truth” is a concept that mathematicians believe they have proven is undeniably true. Euclid has proven that “there are infinitely many primes.” If the mathematical concept of a “necessary truth” if faulty; then one can instead begin by assuming the contrary or that “the number of primes is finite.” Working through a proof with this new anti-rule in place is shown to lead to the logical conclusion that indeed the anti-rule “must be false.” Thus, there is indeed such a thing as a mathematically “necessary” or undeniably true truth. Curiously the editor then addresses the very point that struck my interest. He imagines that it might not be true that “Wittgenstein wrote the Tractatus”, while Euclid’s proof can never be proven false. Wittgenstein argues that logic is the “essence of thought” that acts by “resisting attempts to formulate meaningless expressions” (xxv-xxvii). Wittgenstein’s “Foreword” summaries the point more clearly: “what can be said at all can be said clearly; and whatever cannot be said must be left to silence.” He attempts to find a boundary between “thought” and non-thought or “nonsense”. He confesses that he does not offer sources, and merely thanks the influence of Frege and Bertrand Russell. Wittgenstein frequently refers to this Frege, disagreeing with his opinions, but the “Notes” section states that it is unclear just who this person or the referred to work is, as it is probably Gottlob Frege who might have published something like this in “Der Gedanke: Eine Logische Untersuchung” (“Thought: A Logical Inquiry”, 1918), in the Beitrage zur Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus. Wittgenstein argues: “What makes” a picture’s “truth or falsehood is the agreement or disagreement of its sense with reality” (2.222). “To find out whether a picture is true or false, we must compare it to reality” (2.223). “From the picture alone it is impossible to find out whether it is true or false” (2.224). “A logical picture of facts is a thought” (3). “The totality of true thoughts is a picture of the world” (3.01). The conclusion is drawn that nonsense is impossible because it is impossible to “think illogically”, and thus anything stated (even if nonsensical) must be “logical” (3.02-.03). It is possible to “represent a state of affairs that contradicts the laws of physics, but not one that contradicts the laws of geometry.” This is why there are many science fiction concepts that break physical laws, but few (if any) that debate geometric logic. And then the argument digresses into nonsense, as it circles around the concept of a “proposition”. He derives that “a proposition has no sense” when “nothing corresponds to it” because “it does not designate a thing (a truth-value) whose properties are called ‘false’ or ‘true’” (4.063). With this definition, he claims: “Every proposition must already have a sense. It cannot be given one by affirmation” because “what is affirmed is its sense” (4.064). This is an attempt to prove “nonsense” is impossible, while writing nonsense. “The whole modern worldview is based on the illusion that the so-called laws of nature are the explanations of natural phenomena” (6.371). “And so people stop at the laws of nature as at something unquestionable, just as in the past they once did at God and fate.” Problematically, the “modern… system attempts to make it seem as if everything were explained” (6.372). Something might be happening that could prove a given “law of nature” false. This is what speculative fiction does when it imagines a scenario where a given “law of nature” is disproven in a picture, even if insufficient evidence is given to make it logically or scientifically true.
While I do not agree with Wittgenstein about nonsense, and other points, this is a great book that helped me develop some arguments in a book I am working on. It should similarly help other logicians, and literary or film theorists understand some of the common concepts in this field that go unexplained in other texts. Classics like this one must be read to enter a field such as logic, or theory because so many others are familiar with them, and so their language is the dictionary required to enter. The editor should have done a better job explaining the theory in the intro. Otherwise, most libraries and specialists would benefit from having access to this book.
Pennsylvania Literary Journal: Spring 2025 issue: https://anaphoraliterary.com/journals/plj/plj-excerpts/book-reviews-spring-2025

My thanks to NetGalley and Penguin for an eARC of this new translation of a seminal work of the 20th Century. A bit odd to be offered it now, and as an ARC, as it seems it was first published in 2023. ?????
A book I first read 50 years ago as an undergraduate. I did not "understand" it then, and I don't now either - but the opening and closing "propositions" have always stayed with me.
"The World is all that happens to be the case."
"What cannot be said must be left in silence."
But, as 50 years ago, while I did not comprehend this short, declarative book, that does not mean I did not gain anything from reading it.
The individuals involved in this new translation come at it in a new manner. They are artists, poets, and translators, and treat the document as such. Listing examples of Wittgenstein's influence on modern art itself. But also comparing the short, declarative assertions to Imagist poetry and haiku (which works particulalry well with his "picture theory"). And they provide an example (the first few lines of the book) how the propostions often read like poetry (slight rhymes,, repitition of sounds).
Jan Zwicky's Introduction is particularly helpful here, treating the text as both an example of art, as well as of philosophy. Translator Alexander Booth continues on with both of those approaches in his own short Preface..
Issues - there are no Notes to the text itself. OTOH, that may have ended up making the book 4 times as long! 4 times? Maybe 10 times!
There is no Bibliography, although Zwicky's extensive Notes to her Introduction acts as one to some extent.
They did not include Russell's Introduction - which would have been helpful, even if Wittgenstein did not care for it.
Booth states tha he does not view this as a replacement for previous translations, but as a helpful alternative. Which, kind of does not make sense.
More than a century after its first publication (the only book Wittgenstein published in his lifetime) there are numerous readings and interpretations of this text. No reader is going to completely understand it, and reveal to the rest of us the "true meaning" of the text. So, take Booth and Zwicky's advice, and read it slowly and thoughfully - but do not spend too much time and effort on it. Read it as an work of art.
4 out of 5. My rating is base on the edition itself, rather than on the original work. Which is a 5 out of 5, and a necessary read for any thoughtful person today, It is OK not to "get it", and to be frustrated while reading it. Just move along.